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EDITED BY PAUL SOBEL

RISK WATCH

Carrots and Sticks
A

By auditing executive
compensation and
benefits, auditors can
help their organization
move from risk to
rewards management.
BY SRIDHAR RAMAMOORTI AND
USHA R. BALAKRISHNAN

LTHOUGH THE FOCUS OF RISK MANagement traditionally has been on downside risk, the time is right to focus this
dialogue on upside risk — the management of value-creation opportunities
through "rewards management." After all,
rewards such as bonuses and stock options
are typically greater for those who identify
and leverage new value-creation opportunities. For-profit organizations favor
those individuals who are well-connected
and leverage their relationships to bring in
clients and attract customers. Their selling
ability, revenue-generating strategies, and
overall modus operandi quickly earn them
the coveted title of "rainmakers."
Nevertheless, rewards and incentives
can encourage undesirable behaviors.
Executives quickly learn that managing their organization's accounts is far
easier than managing the organization
itself; indeed, it is sometimes harder to
make the numbers than to "make up" the
numbers. This is a behavioral risk that can
only be managed through human intervention and oversight; technology cannot
ensure everyone complies with regulations
or company policies, or that no one has
unfairly benefitted from undisclosed conflicts of interest.
A recent IIA Practice Guide, Auditing
Executive Compensation and Benefits,
emphasizes that strong governance systems are needed for executive compensation and benefits (ECB) programs. This is
because executives often are in the position of both designing and recommending
their own compensation, which creates a
conflict of interest. Thus, internal auditors should consider speciflc risks regarding the employment market, compliance,
financial reporting, reputation, operations,
and external business relationships.
ECB design and rewards management
pose a key risk for organizations. To date.

the conversation about risk management
primarily has been about adopting the
"sticks" approach with little attention
paid to the "carrots." A balanced risk
management strategy should adopt a
"carrots-and-sticks" approach in which
the carrots encourage desirable behaviors
and the sticks discourage undesirable
behaviors. Tremendous opportunities
exist for auditors to examine and help
manage such sources of risk.
WHY REWARDS
MANAGEMENT MATTERS

Most organizations realize that the key
to attracting, developing, and retaining
talent is a comprehensive and progressive compensation program that reinforces the organization's stated outlook
and the importance of its people. From
a governance standpoint, publicly listed
companies typically have a compensation committee to approve executive
compensation packages. Compensation
consultants frequently advise them in
structuring these packages, but conflicts
of interest among consultants, such as
providing other services to the same
company, are widespread, according to
the Report on Executive Pay: Conflicts
of Interest Among Compensation Consultants, a December 2007 study by the
U.S. House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform.
Clearly, performance measurement and
incentive compensation drives behavior. When the compensation scheme
is poorly designed (i.e., it encourages
reckless risk-taking), one might expect
counterproductive, and even "gaming,"
behavior by executives to meet predefined targets and performance metrics.
Thus, when stock options are purely a
function of stock price, executives may
worry more about increasing the stock
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price than achieving the organization's
goals and objectives.
Recent stock-option "backdating"
scandals are a reminder that when left
unchecked, management and boards
may not simply be indifferent about such
compensation-gaming behavior — they
may actively participate in it. A 2005
research paper by University of Iowa
finance professor Erik Lie drew attention
to the somewhat sinister practice of granting an employee stock option that is retroactively dated to increase its value. Lie
examined options that weren't granted on
the same date each year and discovered a
pattern in which prices fell before the grant
tlate and rose afterward. Neither external
iiuditors nor internal auditors identified
this "rewards management risk," possibly
because stock options-based compensation was not recognized in the financial
statements until 2004.
A CHANGING REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

Outsized CEO compensation has garnered
Attention in recent years. Former U.S.
Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board Chairman William McDonough

characterized the practice of providing
lavish compensation to CEOs whose performance was questionable or below average as being "grotesquely immoral."
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's new Compensation Discussion
and Analysis (CDA) disclosure regime is
designed to assist stockholders in determining whether a company's compensation programs incentivize employees
to take excessive or inappropriate risks.
Similarly, the federal government bailout
of companies devastated by the financial
crisis of 2008 led to the appointment of
Kenneth Feinberg as the Obama administration's "compensation czar." His primary
responsibility was to significandy limit the
compensation of senior executives of companies that had become majority-owned
by the U.S. government as well as for all
recipients of funding from the Troubled
Asset Relief Program.
The "risk from rewards management"
figures prominently in the recendy enacted
U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. Among its
governance provisions related to executive
compensation, the Dodd-Frank Act:
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• Gives shareholders a periodic advisory
vote ("say on pay") on executive compensation and "golden parachutes."
• Prohibits brokers from discretionary
voting in director elections and on
executive compensation matters.
• Requires compensation committees
to enhance independence criteria and
requirements for independent consultants and advisers.
• Imposes requirements for daw-back
policies for erroneously awarded compensation. Currently, 71 of the 100
largest U.S. publicly listed companies
have implemented a claw-back policy.
• Imposes enhanced disclosures for
compensation, company policies
concerning employee and director
hedging transactions, and company
decisions regarding separation of the
CEO and board chairman roles.
Clearly, internal auditing will play a
significant role in ensuring compliance
with the provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act. However, owing to the sensitive
nature of auditing executive compensation, auditors must have an appropriate
audit approach and access to the necessary

W H A T AUDITORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FRAUD
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS SHENANIGANS ARE ENDEMIC. HERE'S HOW YOU CAN ARM
YOURSELF IN THE WAR AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIME.
The Financial Forensics Academy (FFA) and the Consultants' Training Institute (CTI) have developed an intensive, five-day, anti-fraud training
program called. Fraud Risk Management—Navigating

the Perilous Waters of Detecting, Deterring, and Investigating Fraud.

This comprehensive, yet in-depth, program offers auditors a cutting-edge understanding of fraud risk management and provides methods to
reduce these risks within any organization, from small companies to large corporations. Specifically, the course includes the following:
• Understanding the elements of fraud
• Understanding the importance of fraud detection and deterrence controls as they relate to COSO
• The role of governance, ethics, and risk management in deterring fraud
• Comprehensive fraud detection techniques
• Busting the fraud triangle
• Investigative techniques for effective resolution of fraud schemes
2010 Dates and Locations
October 25-30 - The Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, DC
December 6-11 — The Mirage Hotel, Las Vegas, NV
Fraud Risk Management

will arm you with the tools and techniques you need to stem the tide of fraud. For details on this timely workshop,

visit the Training area of www.nacva.com; you'll also find additional forensic accounting and fraud-related courses here. Or simply call Member
Services: (800) 677-2009.

^ ^ ^

Financial Forensics Institute

CON5UUAN1S

c/o Consultants' Training Institute
1111 Brickyard Road, Suite 200 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84106-5401
Tel: (801) 486-0600 • Fax: (801) 486-7500 • Internet: www.nacva.com
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information. Despite obstacles to obtaining this information, internal auditing
needs to proceed in accordance with its
charter. Its audit scope should focus on
the board, management, and extended
business relationships.
AUDITING COMPENSATION

As regulators and shareholders look
more closely at executive compensation,
internal auditors need to define their
responsibilities in addressing rewardsmanagement risks. Auditors must realize that the attitude toward risk-taking is
largely determined by the organization's
compensation practices and culture.
Taking calculated gambles is one thing,
but reckless risk-taking can spell ruin,
especially when short-term rewards are
personalized for gain, and longer-term
risks can be socialized with impunity. A
balanced, coUaboratively designed oversight fimction can keep track of behaviors
and performance metrics. For example,
internal auditing can counsel human
resources, the general counsel, the chief
risk officer, the CEO, and the board about
rewards-management risks.

The Institute of
Internal Auditors

Compensation committees bring transparency to ECB design and disclosures by
subjecting themselves to an ECB audit.
Indeed, when internal auditing is authorized to conduct these audits, the independent and objective scrutiny can ensure
that the resulting compensation packages
have credibility and integrity.
An ECB audit should focus on several
key dimensions:
• Promoting greater awareness of
"rewards management" strategies as
a source of risk. The compensation
committee must understand the organization's overall mission and objectives, as well as its risk appetite and
tolerance as it evaluates ECB design.
• Cultivating an appropriate philosophy
and structure for compensation committees to ensure that members are
independent directors without any
undisclosed confiicts of interest.
• Determining the process for selecting
compensation consultants, evaluating
the independence as well as the competence of consultants engaged.
• Evaluating the reasonableness of
executive pay and perks. This delicate
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audit area requires the highest degree
of sensitivity, confidentiality, and collaboration with board members.
• Ensuring that all regulatory disclosure
requirements (e.g., CDA) are complied with appropriately, adequately,
and accurately.
Parveen Gupta suggested in a 2004
Internal Auditor article that ECB audits
are uncharted territory for most internal
auditors; remarkably, they continue to
be. In many cases, internal auditing may
not have the appropriate organizational
positioning, stature, and competence to
perform them. Nevertheless, auditors
should welcome this expansion of their
governance-related mandate. Auditors
can move beyond the audit committee
to become the compensation committee's
eyes and ears, helping the organization
practice effective rewards management.

TO COMMENT on this article, e-mail the
authors at sridhar.rainamoorti@theiia.org.
SEND RISK WATCH article ideas to Paul
Sobel at paul.sobel@mirant.com.
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